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Abstract— In this work, the cross-layer design problem of
joint multiuser detection and power control is studied using a
game-theoretic approach. The uplink of a direct-sequence code
division multiple access (DS-CDMA) data network is considered
and a non-cooperative game is proposed in which users in the
network are allowed to choose their uplink receivers as well as
their transmit powers to maximize their own utilities. The utility
function measures the number of reliable bits transmitted by the
user per joule of energy consumed. Focusing on linear receivers,
the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game is derived. It is
shown that the equilibrium is one where the powers are SIR-
balanced with the minimum mean square error (MMSE) detector
as the receiver. In addition, this framework is used to study power
control games for the matched filter, the decorrelator, and the
MMSE detector; and the receivers’ performance is compared in
terms of the utilities achieved at equilibrium (in bits/Joule). The
optimal cooperative solution is also discussed and compared with
the non-cooperative approach. Extensions of the results to the
case of multiple receive antennas are also presented. In addition,
an admission control scheme based on maximizing the total utility
in the network is proposed.
Index Terms— Power control, game theory, Nash equilibrium,
utility function, multiuser detectors, cross-layer design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power control is used for resource allocation and inter-
ference management in both the uplink and the downlink
of Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) systems. In the
uplink, the purpose of power control is for each user to
transmit enough power so that it can achieve the required
quality of service (QoS) at the uplink receiver without causing
unnecessary interference to other users in the system. One
approach that has been very successful in providing insights
into design of power control algorithms for data networks is
the game-theoretic approach studied in [1]–[12]. In [1], the
authors provide motivations for using game theory to study
communication systems, and in particular power control. In
[2] and [3], power control is modeled as a non-cooperative
game in which users choose their transmit powers in order
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to maximize their utilities, where utility is defined as the
ratio of throughput to transmit power. In [4], a network-
assisted power control scheme is proposed to improve the
overall utility of the system. The authors in [5] and [6] use
pricing to obtain a more efficient solution for the power control
game. Similar approaches are taken in [7]–[10] for different
utility functions. Joint network-centric and user-centric power
control is discussed in [11]. In [12], the authors propose a
power control game for multi-carrier CDMA systems. In all
the work done so far, the receiver is assumed to be a simple
matched filter. No work has taken into account the effects of
the receiver on power control. Also, all prior work in this area
has concentrated on single antenna receivers.
This work is the first one that tackles the cross-layer design
problem of joint multiuser detection and power control in
the context of a non-cooperative game-theoretic setting. It
attempts to bring a cross-layer design perspective to all the
earlier work that has studied power control from a game-
theoretic point of view. Our focus throughout this work is on
energy efficiency. We are mainly concerned with applications
where it is more important to maximize the number of bits
transmitted per joule of energy consumed than to maximize
throughput. We first propose a non-cooperative (distributed)
game in which users are allowed to choose their uplink
receivers as well as their transmit powers. We focus on linear
receivers and derive the Nash equilibrium for the proposed
game. In addition, we use this framework to study power
control for the matched filter, the decorrelator [13] and the
minimum mean square error (MMSE) [14] receiver. We show
that regardless of the type of receiver, the Nash equilibrium
is an SIR-balancing solution with the same target SIR (signal
to interference plus noise ratio) for all receiver types1. Using
a large-system analysis, we derive explicit expressions for the
utilities achieved at equilibrium for each receiver type. This
allows us to compare the performance of these receivers in
terms of energy efficiency (i.e., the number of bits transmitted
per joule of energy consumed). In addition, the performance
of our non-cooperative approach is compared with the optimal
cooperative (centralized) approach. It is shown that only for
the matched filter is the difference in performance between
these two approaches significant. For the decorrelator, the two
solutions are identical, and for the MMSE receiver, the utility
achieved by the Pareto-optimal solution is only slightly greater
than that achieved by the non-cooperative approach. We also
extend our analysis to the case where multiple receive antennas
1This can also be shown to be true even for some non-linear receivers [15].
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are used at the uplink receiver. The effects of power pooling
and interference reduction, which are the benefits of using
multiple receive antennas, are demonstrated and quantified for
the matched filter, the decorrelator, and the MMSE receiver
in terms of the utilities achieved at equilibrium. A utility-
maximizing admission control scheme is also presented. We
show that using the proposed scheme, the number of admitted
users for the MMSE receiver is greater than or equal to the
total number of admitted users for the matched filter and
decorrelator combined. These results constitute the first study
of power control and receiver design in a unified framework.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II,
we provide the background for this work, while the system
model is given in Section III. We describe our proposed power
control game in Section IV and derive the Nash equilibrium for
this game. In Section V, we use the game-theoretic framework
along with a large-system analysis to compare the performance
of various linear receivers in terms of achieved utilities. The
Pareto-optimal solution to the power control game is discussed
in Section VI and its performance is compared with that
of the non-cooperative approach. Extensions of our analysis
to multi-antenna systems are given in Section VII. We then
present a utility-maximizing admission control scheme in
Section VIII. Numerical results and conclusions are provided
in Sections IX and X, respectively. Throughout this work, we
concentrate on the uplink of a synchronous direct-sequence
CDMA (DS-CDMA) wireless data network.
II. BACKGROUND
Consider the uplink of a DS-CDMA data network where
each user wishes to locally and selfishly choose its action in
such way as to maximize its own utility. The strategy chosen
by a user affects the performance of other users in the network
through multiple-access interference. In such a multiple-access
network, there are several questions to ask concerning the
interaction among the users. First of all, what is a reasonable
choice of a utility function that measures energy efficiency?
Secondly, given such a utility function, what strategy should
a user choose in order to maximize its utility? If every user in
the network selfishly and locally picks its utility-maximizing
strategy, will there be a stable state at which no user can
unilaterally improve its utility (Nash equilibrium)? What are
some of the properties of such an equilibrium? How does
such a non-cooperative approach compare with a cooperative
scheme?
Game theory is the natural framework for modeling and
studying such an interaction. To pose the power control
problem as a non-cooperative game, we first need to define
a utility function suitable for measuring energy efficiency for
data applications. Most data applications are sensitive to error
but tolerant to delay. It is clear that a higher SIR level at the
output of the receiver will result in a lower bit error rate and
hence higher throughput. However, achieving a high SIR level
often requires the user terminal to transmit at a high power
which in turn results in low battery life. These issues can be
quantified (as in [2]) by defining the utility function of a user
to be the ratio of its throughput to its transmit power, i.e.,
uk =
Tk
pk
. (1)
Throughput here is the net number of information bits that are
transmitted without error per unit time.
Let fs(γk) represent the probability that a packet is received
without an error, where γk is the SIR for user k. Our
assumption is that if a packet has one or more bit errors,
it will be retransmitted. Assuming that retransmissions are
independent, the average number of transmissions necessary
to receive a packet correctly is equal to 1
fs(γk)
. Therefore, we
have
Tk =
L
M
Rkfs(γk), (2)
where L and M are the number of information bits and
the total number of bits in a packet, respectively; and Rk
is the transmission rate for the kth user, which is the ratio
of the bandwidth to the processing gain. The packet suc-
cess rate (PSR), which is represented by fs(γk), depends
on the details of the data transmission such as modulation,
coding, and packet size. In most practical cases, however,
fs(γk) is increasing and has a sigmoidal shape. For example,
when the modulation is BPSK (binary phase shift keying)
and the noise is additive white Gaussian, fs(γk) is given
by
(
1−Q(√2γk)
)M
, where Q(·) is the complementary cu-
mulative distribution function of a standard normal random
variable. Notice that, in this case, fs(0) = 2−M is strictly
positive due to the possibility of random guessing at the
receiver. This means that based on our definition for the
utility function, a user can potentially achieve infinite utility
by transmitting zero power.
To prevent the above undesirable situation, we replace the
PSR with an efficiency function, f(γk), when calculating the
throughput for our utility function. The efficiency function
should closely approximate the PSR and have the desirable
property that f(0) = 0. The efficiency function can for
example be defined as f(γk) = fs(γk) − fs(0). In almost
all practical cases and for moderate to large values of M (e.g.
M = 100), fs(0) is very small and, hence, f(γk) ≃ fs(γk). In
addition, for this efficiency function we have f(0) = 0. The
plot of f(γk) for the BPSK modulation and additive white
Gaussian noise is given in Fig. 1 with M = 100 (see [16] for
a detailed discussion of this efficiency function).
The exact expression for the efficiency function is not
crucial. Our analysis throughout this paper is valid for any
efficiency function that is increasing and S-shaped2 with
f(0) = 0 and f(+∞) = 1, and has a continuous deriva-
tive. These assumptions are valid in many practical systems.
Throughout this paper, we assume that all users have the
same efficiency function. Generalization to the case where
the efficiency function is dependent on k is straightforward.
Note that the throughput Tk in (2) could also be replaced with
the Shannon capacity formula if the utility function in (1) is
appropriately modified to ensure that uk = 0 when pk = 0.
2An increasing function is S-shaped if there is a point above which the
function is concave, and below which the function is convex.
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Fig. 2. User’s Utility as a Function of Transmit Power for Fixed Interference.
Combining (1) with (2), and replacing the PSR with the
efficiency function, we can write the utility function of the
kth user as
uk =
L
M
Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (3)
This utility function, which has units of bits/Joule, repre-
sents the total number of data bits that are delivered to the
destination without an error per joule of energy consumed.
This utility function captures very well the tradeoff between
throughput and battery life and is particularly suitable for
applications where saving power is more important than
achieving a high throughput. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that the transmission rate is the same for all users,
i.e., R1 = · · · = RK = R. All the results obtained here can be
easily generalized to the case of unequal rates. Fig. 2 shows
the shape of the utility function in (3) as a function of transmit
power keeping other users’ transmit powers fixed.
Power control is modelled as a non-cooperative game in
which each user tries to selfishly maximize its own utility. It is
shown in [17] that, when matched filters are used as the uplink
receivers, if user terminals are allowed to choose only their
transmit powers for maximizing their utilities, then there exists
an equilibrium point at which no user can improve its utility
given the power levels of other users (Nash equilibrium). In
this work, we extend this game-theoretic approach to study
the cross-layer design problem of joint multiuser detection
and power control. In particular, we propose a non-cooperative
game in which the users are allowed to choose their uplink
receivers as well as their transmit powers.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the uplink of a DS-CDMA system with pro-
cessing gain N (defined as the ratio of symbol duration to chip
duration). We assume that there are K users in the network
and focus on a single cell. Thus, we assume that all K user
terminals transmit to a receiver at a common concentration
point, such as a cellular base station or other network access
point. For now, we assume that each of the transmitters and
the receiver has one antenna. The signal received by the uplink
receiver (after chip-matched filtering) sampled at the chip rate
over one symbol duration can be expressed as
r =
K∑
k=1
√
pkhk bksk +w, (4)
where pk, hk, bk and sk are the transmit power, channel
gain, transmitted bit and spreading sequence of the kth user,
respectively, and w is the noise vector which is assumed to be
Gaussian with mean 0 and covariance σ2I. We assume random
spreading sequences for all users, i.e., sk = 1√
N
[v1...vN ]
T
,
where the vi’s are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables taking values {−1,+1} with equal
probabilities.
Let us represent the linear uplink receiver of the kth user
by a coefficient vector, ck. The output of this receiver can be
written as
yk = ck
T
r
=
√
pkhk bkc
T
k sk +
∑
j 6=k
√
pjhj bjck
T
sj + c
T
kw.(5)
Given (5), the SIR of the kth user at the output of its receiver
is
γk =
pkh
2
k(c
T
k sk)
2
σ2cTk ck +
∑
j 6=k pjh
2
j (c
T
k sj)
2
. (6)
In all the previous work in this area, the receive filter is
assumed to be a simple matched filter and maximization of
the utility function is done over the transmit power only. In
the following section, we extend this approach by allowing
the users to choose their receivers in addition to their transmit
powers. It should be noted that although we focus on flat
fading channels in this paper, all of our analysis can be eas-
ily extended to frequency-selective channels by appropriately
defining an effective spreading sequence for each user. In
particular, the effective spreading sequence for user k is the
response of the frequency-selective channel to the transmitted
spreading sequence of user k.
4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. X, NO. X, MONTH X
IV. THE NON-COOPERATIVE POWER CONTROL GAME
Here, we propose a non-cooperative game in which
each user seeks to maximize its own utility by choosing
its transmit power and the receive filter coefficients. Let
G = [K, {Ak}, {uk}] denote the proposed non-cooperative
game where K = {1, ...,K}, and Ak = [0, Pmax] × RN is
the strategy set for the kth user. Here, Pmax is the maximum
allowed power for transmission. Each strategy in Ak can be
written as ak = (pk, ck) where pk and ck are the transmit
power and the receive filter coefficients, respectively, of user
k. Hence, the resulting non-cooperative game can be expressed
as the following maximization problem:
max
ak
uk = max
pk, ck
uk(pk, ck) for k = 1, ...,K. (7)
Assuming equal transmission rates for all users, (7) can be
expressed as
max
pk, ck
f(γk(pk, ck))
pk
for k = 1, ...,K, (8)
where we have explicitly shown that γk is a function of pk
and ck as expressed in (6). A Nash equilibrium is a set of
strategies such that no user can unilaterally improve its own
utility [18]. We now state and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The Nash equilibrium for the non-
cooperative game in (7) is given by (p∗k, c∗k) where
c
∗
k is the vector of MMSE receiver coefficients and
p∗k = min(p
MMSE
k , Pmax). Here, pMMSEk is the transmit
power that results in an SIR equal to γ∗, the solution
to f(γ) = γf ′(γ), at the output of the MMSE receiver.
Furthermore, this equilibrium is unique (up to a scaling factor
for the MMSE filter coefficients).
Proof: We first show that at Nash equilibrium the receiver
has to be the MMSE receiver. Since the choice of receiver is
independent of the transmit power, we can write
max
pk, ck
f(γk(pk, ck))
pk
= max
pk
maxck f(γk(pk, ck))
pk
= max
pk
f(maxck γk(pk, ck))
pk
, (9)
where the second equality is due to the fact that f(γ) is
an increasing function of γ. It is well known that for any
given set of transmit powers, the MMSE receiver achieves
the maximum SIR among all linear receivers [19]. Therefore,
the MMSE receiver achieves the maximum utility among all
linear receivers. For any output SIR, a user can always choose
the MMSE detector to achieve the desired SIR at a lower
transmit power compared to any other linear receiver. A lower
transmit power directly translates into a higher utility for the
user. Therefore, at Nash equilibrium (if it exists), the receiver
must be the MMSE receiver.
The SIR at the output of the MMSE receiver
is given by γMMSEk = pkh2k(sTkA
−1
k sk), where
Ak =
∑
j 6=k pjh
2
jsjs
T
j + σ
2
I. Since ∂γ
MMSE
k
∂pk
=
γMMSE
k
pk
,
maximizing the utility function for each user is
equivalent to finding γ∗ that is the (positive) solution
to f(γk) = γk f ′(γk)3. If the required power for achieving
γ∗ is larger than Pmax, the utility function is maximized
when pk = Pmax. Note that γ∗ is independent of k as long
as all users have the same efficiency function.
So far, we have shown that at Nash equilibrium (if it exists),
the receiver is the MMSE detector and each user’s transmit
power is chosen to maximize the utility function with this
set of filter coefficients. Therefore, as in [6], the existence of
the Nash equilibrium for the game in (7) can be shown via
the quasiconcavity of each user’s utility function in its own
power4. For an S-shaped efficiency function, with the MMSE
detector as the receive filter, f(γk)
pk
is quasiconcave in pk and,
hence, a Nash equilibrium always exists.
Furthermore, for an S-shaped efficiency function,
f(γk) = γk f
′(γk) has a unique solution, γ∗, which is
the (unique) maximizer of the utility function [20]. Because
of the uniqueness of γ∗ and the one-to-one correspondence
between the transmit power and achieved SIR at the output
of the MMSE receiver, the above Nash equilibrium is unique.
The above equilibrium can be reached using the following
iterative algorithm. Given any set of users’ transmit powers,
the receiver filter coefficients can be adjusted to the MMSE
coefficients. Each user can then adjust its transmit power to
achieve γ∗ at the output of the receiver. These steps can be
repeated until convergence is reached (see [21] for the proof
of convergence). It should be noted that γ∗ is the only SIR
value at which a line tangent to the curve describing f(γ)
passes through the origin (see [20]). Throughout this paper, we
assume that Pmax is sufficiently large that γ∗ can be achieved
by all users.
In contrast to the traditional CDMA voice networks (e.g.,
IS-95) where the target SIR is determined by the desired voice
quality, the common SIR here is determined by the utility
function which in turn is a function of the throughput which
depends on the modulation and coding schemes as well as the
packet size.
V. COMPARISON OF POWER CONTROL GAMES FOR
LINEAR RECEIVERS
In the previous section, we showed that the MMSE receiver
achieves the maximum utility among all linear receivers and
hence is the receiver chosen by users at the Nash equilibrium.
In this section, we fix the receiver type and allow users to
choose their transmit powers only. We focus on the matched
filter, the decorrelator, and the MMSE detector and obtain
the Nash equilibrium for the corresponding power control
games. We show that irrespective of the receiver type, the Nash
equilibrium is an SIR-balancing solution with the same target
SIR for all receiver types. A large-system analysis is then used
to obtain closed-form expressions for the utilities achieved at
equilibria. This allows us to compare the performance of these
3This is shown by taking the derivative of uk with respect to pk and
equating it to zero.
4A function is quasiconcave if there exists a point below which the function
is non-decreasing, and above which the function is non-increasing.
MESHKATI et al.: A UTILITY-BASED APPROACH TO POWER CONTROL AND RECEIVER DESIGN IN WIRELESS DATA NETWORKS 5
receivers in terms of the number of bits transmitted per joule
of energy consumed.
By picking a particular receiver, the power control game
reduces to
max
pk
f(γk)
pk
for k = 1, ...,K. (10)
The relationship between the achieved SIR and transmit power
depends on the particular choice of the receiver. A necessary
condition for Nash equilibrium is that ∂uk
∂pk
= 0, i.e.,
pk
∂γk
∂pk
f ′(γk)− f(γk) = 0 . (11)
We now examine this condition for the three detectors under
consideration.
For the conventional matched filter, we have ck = sk and,
hence,
γMFk =
pkh
2
k
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k pjh
2
j(s
T
k sj)
2
. (12)
For the decorrelator, we have C = [c1 ... cK ] = S(STS)−1
(for K ≤ N ), where S = [s1 ... sK ]. Hence,
γDEk =
pkh
2
k
σ2cTk ck
. (13)
The filter coefficients for the MMSE receiver are given by
ck =
√
pkhk
1+pkh2k(s
T
k
A
−1
k
sk)
A
−1
k sk (up to a scaling factor), where
Ak =
∑
j 6=k pjh
2
jsjs
T
j + σ
2
I. This results in
γMMSEk = pkh
2
k(s
T
kA
−1
k sk) . (14)
It is observed that for all three receivers, we have
∂γk
∂pk
=
γk
pk
. (15)
Therefore, maximizing the utility function for each user is
equivalent to finding γ∗ that is the solution to
f(γ) = γ f ′(γ) . (16)
It is known that if K and N are large, the interference
plus noise term at the output of the matched filter can be
approximated as a Gaussian random variable [22]. For the
decorrelator, since the multiple-access interference is removed
completely, the noise term at the output of the receiver is
Gaussian. In the case of the MMSE receiver, it has been
shown that the interference plus noise term at the output is well
approximated by a Gaussian random variable [23]. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that f(γ) is the same for these
receivers. In addition, since the solution to (16) is the same for
all users (provided that all users have the same modulation and
packet size), the solution to the power control game is SIR-
balanced with the same target SIR, γ∗, independent of the
choice of receiver. Of course, the amount of transmit power
needed to achieve γ∗ is dependent on the uplink receiver used
and the channel gain (which will depend, for example, on the
distance between transmitter and receiver). This means that
while all the users achieve the same throughput, their utilities
will depend on their channel gains and their receivers. In
contrast to voice systems in which the target SIR depends only
on the desired quality of voice, here the target SIR is dependent
on the efficiency function and is influenced by the modulation
and packet size. It should be noted that as long as the efficiency
function is increasing and sigmoidal, f(γ) = γ f ′(γ) has a
unique solution.
Based on (12)–(14), the amount of transmit power required
to achieve the target SIR, γ∗, will depend on the random
spreading sequence of each user. In order to obtain quantitative
results for the utility function corresponding to each receiver,
we appeal to a large system analysis similar to that presented
in [24]. We consider the asymptotic case where K,N → ∞
and K
N
→ α <∞. This allows us to write SIR expressions that
are independent of the spreading sequences of the users. It has
been shown in [24] that, for large systems, the SIR expressions
for the matched filter, the decorrelator and the MMSE receiver
are approximately given by
γMFk =
pkh
2
k
σ2 + 1
N
∑
j 6=k pjh
2
j
, (17)
γDEk =
pkh
2
k(1− α)
σ2
for α < 1 , (18)
and γMMSEk =
pkh
2
k
σ2 + 1
N
∑
j 6=k I(pjh
2
j , pkh
2
k, γ
MMSE
k )
,(19)
where I(a, b, c) = ab
b+ac .
It is clear that both γMFk and γDEk satisfy
∂γk
∂pk
= γk
pk
. It
can also be verified that any γk which satisfies ∂γk∂pk =
γk
pk
is a solution to (19). As a result, we claim that similar to
the previous section, finding the solution to power control
in large systems is equivalent to finding the solution of
f(γ) = γ f ′(γ), independent of the type of the receiver used.
Here again, the solution to this equation is independent of k
which means that all users will seek to achieve the same SIR,
γ∗, at the output of the uplink receiver.
The minimum power solution for achieving γ∗ by all users
is given by the following equations for the three different
receivers (see [24]):
pMFk =
1
h2k
γ∗σ2
1− αγ∗ for α <
1
γ∗
, (20)
pDEk =
1
h2k
γ∗σ2
1− α for α < 1 , (21)
and pMMSEk =
1
h2k
γ∗σ2
1− α γ∗1+γ∗
for α < 1 + 1
γ∗
.(22)
Combining (20)–(22) with uk = LMR f(γ
∗)
pk
, we obtain
uk =
LRf(γ∗)h2k
Mγ∗σ2
Γ , (23)
where Γ is dependent on the type of receiver. In particular,
ΓMF = 1− αγ∗ for α < 1
γ∗ , (24)
ΓDE = 1− α for α < 1 , (25)
and ΓMMSE = 1− α γ
∗
1 + γ∗
for α < 1 + 1
γ∗ .(26)
It can be seen that uMMSEk ≥ uDEk and uMMSEk ≥ uMFk
which confirms our earlier claim that the MMSE receiver
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achieves the maximum utility among all linear receivers. The
utility achieved by the decorrelator is higher than that of the
matched filter except when γ∗ < 1(= 0dB).
VI. SOCIAL OPTIMUM
The solution to the power control game is Pareto optimal
if there exists no other power allocation for which one or
more users can improve their utilities without reduction in
the utilities of the other users. It can be shown that the Nash
equilibrium presented in the previous section is not Pareto
optimal. This means that it is possible to improve the utility
of one or more users without hurting other users. On the other
hand, it can be shown that the solution to the following social
problem gives the Pareto optimal frontier (see [17]):
max
p1,...,pK
K∑
k=1
βkuk(p1, ..., pK) . (27)
Pareto optimal solutions are in general difficult to obtain.
Here, we consider the case of equal output SIRs among
all users (i.e., SIR balancing). This ensures fairness among
users in terms of throughput and delay. We also assume that
β1 = · · · = βK = 1, which means we are interested in maxi-
mizing the sum of users’ utilities. Therefore, the maximization
in (27) can be written as
max
p1,...,pK
f(γ)
K∑
k=1
1
pk
. (28)
Equal output SIRs among users is achieved with minimum
power consumption when the received powers are the same
for all users, i.e., p1h21 = p2h22 = · · · = pKh2K = q, where
qMF (γ) =
γσ2
1− αγ for α <
1
γ
, (29)
qDE(γ) =
γσ2
1− α for α < 1 , (30)
and qMMSE(γ) = γσ
2
1− α γ1+γ
for α < 1 + 1
γ
. (31)
Therefore, the maximization in (28) can equivalently be ex-
pressed as
max
γ
f(γ)
q(γ)
K∑
k=1
h2k . (32)
The solution to (32) must satisfy ∂
∂γ
( f(γ)
q(γ) ) = 0 . Using this
fact, combined with (29)–(31), gives us the equations that must
be satisfied by the solution to the maximization problem in
(32) for the three linear receivers:
MF : f(γ) = γ(1− αγ)f ′(γ) , (33)
DE : f(γ) = γf ′(γ) , (34)
and MMSE : f(γ) = γ
[
1−
αγ
(1 + γ)2 − αγ2
]
f
′(γ) .(35)
It should be noted that while the maximizations in (10) and
(32) look similar, there is an important difference between
them. In (10), the assumption is that there is no cooperation
among users. This means each user chooses its transmit
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Fig. 3. Plot of g(γ) = 1 − αγ
(1+γ)2−αγ2
for Different Values of System
Load.
power independent of other users’ powers. On the other hand,
(32) assumes that users cooperate in choosing their transmit
powers. The consequence is that the relationship between the
user’s SIR and transmit power is different from the non-
cooperative case.
We see from (33)–(35) that for the decorrelator the Pareto-
optimal solution is the same as the solution obtained by the
non-cooperative utility-maximizing method. This is because
the equilibrium transmit power of each user is independent
of other users’ transmit powers (see (13) and (18)). Another
observation is that as shown in Fig. 3, for a large range of
values of α, 1 − αγ(1+γ)2−αγ2 ≃ 1. This means that for the
MMSE receiver, the target SIR for the non-cooperative game,
γ∗, is close to the target SIR for the Pareto-optimal solution.
This will be verified in Section IX using simulation.
VII. EXTENSIONS TO MULTI-ANTENNA SYSTEMS
We now extend the analysis presented in the previous
sections to multi-antenna systems. In particular, we focus on
the case of receive diversity, i.e., multiple antennas at the
uplink receiver.
We assume that each user terminal has one transmit antenna
and there are m receive antennas at the uplink receiver.
The received signal (after chip-matched filtering and chip-
rate sampling) can be represented as an N × m matrix, R,
where the lth column represents the N chips received at the
lth antenna, i.e.,
R =
K∑
k=1
√
pk bk skh
T
k +W , (36)
where pk, bk and sk are the transmit power, transmitted bit
and spreading sequence of the kth user, respectively. Here,
hk = [hk1 ... hkm ]
T represents the gain vector in which
hk1, ..., hkm are the channel gains from the transmitter of the
kth user to the m receive antennas and are assumed to be
independent and identically distributed. In the above equation,
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W is the noise matrix. We assume that the noise is Gaussian
and both spatially and temporally white.
Let Ck be the N × m coefficient matrix for the spatial-
temporal filter of the kth user at the base station. This filter
performs linear spatial and temporal processing on the received
signal. The output of this receiver can be written as
yk = tr(C
T
kR), (37)
where tr(A) is the trace of A.
Here, following an approach similar to that in Section IV,
we propose a game in which users in the network are allowed
to choose their uplink linear spatial-temporal receivers as well
as their transmit powers. Hence, the resulting non-cooperative
game can be expressed as the following maximization prob-
lem:
max
pk, Ck
uk(pk,Ck) for k = 1, ...,K. (38)
This maximization can equivalently be expressed as
max
pk, c¯k
uk(pk, c¯k) for k = 1, ...,K, (39)
where c¯k is a vector with mN elements. It is obtained by
stacking the columns of Ck on top of each other. To see this,
notice that yk in (37) can be alternatively written as
yk = c¯
T
k r¯ , (40)
where r¯ is a vector obtained by placing columns of R on top
of each other, i.e.,
r¯ =
K∑
k=1
√
pk bks¯k + w¯, (41)
where s¯k = [hk1sTk ... hkmsTk ]T is the effective signature and
w¯ is the noise vector consisting of columns of W stacked on
top of each other.
The game expressed in (39) is very similar to the one in
(7). As a result, all of our analysis for the single antenna case
can be carried over to the multi-antenna scenario. Hence, we
skip the analysis and state the main results:
• The MMSE receiver, whose coefficients are given by
c¯k =
√
pk
1 + pk(¯sTk A¯
−1
k s¯k)
A¯
−1
k s¯k , (42)
achieves the maximum utility among all linear receivers.
Here, A¯k =
∑
j 6=k pj s¯j s¯
T
j + σ
2
I.
• Given the MMSE receiver coefficients, maximizing the
utility function for each user is again equivalent to finding
the solution γ∗ to f(γ) = γ f ′(γ).
• Nash equilibrium is reached when all user terminals use
the MMSE detector for their uplink receivers and transmit
at a power level that results in an SIR equal to γ∗ (SIR-
balancing). This equilibrium is unique.
We now fix the receiver type and allow users to choose
their transmit powers only, as we did in Section V. We again
focus on the matched filter, the decorrelator and the MMSE
detector. We discuss the resulting Nash equilibria for these
three receivers and compare their performance using a large-
system analysis.
The matched filter is assumed to have perfect knowledge
of the channel gains of the desired user but knows only the
statistics of the fading levels of the interferers. It basically
performs despreading at each receive antenna and then applies
maximal ratio combining (MRC). The decorrelating detector
is assumed to have perfect knowledge of the channel gains for
the desired user but no knowledge about the interferers (except
for their spreading sequences). It applies a decorrelator at each
receive antenna and then performs maximal ratio combining.
The MMSE detector is assumed to have perfect knowledge of
the channel gains of all users. The filter coefficients for the
MMSE receiver are given by (42).
It is straightforward to show that for all three receivers, we
have
∂γk
∂pk
=
γk
pk
. (43)
Therefore, maximizing the utility function for each user is
again equivalent to finding γ∗ that is the solution to f(γ) =
γ f ′(γ). Using a large-system analysis similar to the one
presented in Section V, the achieved utility for user k can
be expressed as
uk =
LRf(γ∗)h¯2k
Mγ∗σ2
Γ¯ , (44)
where Γ¯ depends on the receiver:
Γ¯MF = 1− α¯γ∗ for α¯ < 1
γ∗ , (45)
Γ¯DE = 1− α for α < 1 , (46)
and Γ¯MMSE = 1− α¯ γ
∗
1 + γ∗
for α¯ < 1 +
1
γ∗ ,(47)
with α¯ = α
m
and h¯2k =
∑m
l=1 h
2
kl. It is observed that for the
case of the matched filter and the MMSE detector, using more
antennas at the receiver provides both power pooling (through
h¯k) and interference reduction (through α¯). This means that the
system behaves like a single-antenna system with processing
gain mN and received power equal to the sum of the received
powers at the individual antennas. The decorrelator, on the
other hand, benefits only from power pooling and there is
no pooling of the degrees of freedom. This is because the
decorrelating detector has no knowledge about the channel
gains for the interferers. Therefore, each interferer effectively
occupies m degrees of freedom [25].
VIII. UTILITY-MAXIMIZING ADMISSION CONTROL
We have used a large-system analysis to derive explicit
expressions for the utilities achieved at Nash equilibrium for
the matched filter, the decorrelator, and the MMSE detector.
We now pose admission control as a maximization problem
in which the load in the network (i.e., α) is chosen such
that the total utility in the network (per degree of freedom)
is maximized:
α∗ = argmax
α
1
N
K∑
k=1
uk . (48)
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Given (23), as K,N → ∞, we can use the law of large
numbers to write
α∗ = argmax
α
α
LRf(γ∗)
Mγ∗σ2
Γ E{h2} , (49)
or equivalently
α∗ = argmax
α
α Γ . (50)
To find α∗, we set ∂
∂α
(αΓ) = 0 and solve for α. It is easy
to show that α∗ is the solution to Γ = 12 . This is also true
for the Pareto-optimal solution discussed in Section VI. Given
(24)–(26), we have
α∗MF =
1
2γ∗
, (51)
α∗DE =
1
2
, (52)
and α∗MMSE =
1
2
+
1
2γ∗
. (53)
Following an argument similar to that above, it can be
shown that for the case of multiple receive antennas, the
total utility per degree of freedom is maximized when α is
chosen to be the solution to Γ¯ = 12 . Notice that using this
utility-maximizing admission control scheme, the number of
admitted users for the MMSE receiver is greater than or equal
to the total number of admitted users for the matched filter and
decorrelator combined (depending on the number of antennas
employed at the uplink receiver).
IX. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results for the analysis
presented in the previous sections. We consider the uplink of a
DS-CDMA system. We assume that each packet contains 100
bits of information and no overhead (i.e., L = M = 100).
The transmission rate, R, is 100Kbps and the thermal noise
power, σ2, is 5 × 10−16Watts. The processing gain is 100
to satisfy the large system assumption. A useful example for
the efficiency function is f(γ) = (1 − e−γ)M . This serves
as an approximation to the PSR that is very reasonable for
moderate to large values of M . We use this efficiency for our
simulations. Using this, with M = 100, the solution to (16)
is γ∗ = 6.48 = 8.1dB.
We first look at the case of one receive antenna. The channel
gains are assumed to have the Rayleigh distribution with mean
equal to 0.3
d2
, where d is the distance of the user from the uplink
receiver. Fig. 4 shows the average utility of a user as a function
of the system load for the matched filter, decorrelator and
MMSE receivers. The user is assumed to be 100 meters away
from the uplink receiver. The averaging is done over 5000
channel realizations. The solid and dashed lines correspond to
the non-cooperative and Pareto-optimal solutions, respectively.
It is seen from the figure that the utility improves considerably
when the matched filter is replaced by a multiuser detector.
Also, the system capacity (i.e., the maximum number of users
that can be accommodated by the system) is larger for the
multiuser receivers as compared with the matched filter. As
expected, the MMSE receiver achieves the highest utility.
While the difference between the non-cooperative approach
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and the Pareto-optimal solution is significant for the matched
filter, the solutions are identical for the decorrelator and are
quite close to each other for the MMSE receiver. It is seen
that for the matched filter, as the system load increases, the
gap between the non-cooperative and Pareto-optimal solutions
becomes larger. This is also true for the MMSE receiver
(although much less noticeably). Fig. 5 compares the target
SIR of the non-cooperative solutions with the target SIRs of
the Pareto-optimal solutions for the matched filter and the
MMSE detector. It is seen that for the MMSE receiver, the
target SIR for the Pareto-optimal solution is very close to the
target SIR for the non-cooperative approach.
Fig. 6 shows the average utility as a function of the system
load for one and two receive antennas. The user is 100 meters
away from the uplink receiver and the channel gains are
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.
assumed to be i.i.d. with a Rayleigh distribution having a mean
equal to 0.3
d2
. The averaging is done over 5000 realizations
of the channel gains. For each realization, we use (44) to
calculate the user’s utility. The figure shows the achieved
utilities for the matched filter, the decorrelator and the MMSE
receiver. The dashed lines correspond to m = 1 (single receive
antenna) and the solid lines represent the case of m = 2 (two
receive antennas). Significant improvements in user utility and
system capacity are observed when two receive antennas are
used compared to the single antenna case. As expected, the
improvement is more significant for the matched filter and the
MMSE receiver as compared with the decorrelating detector.
This is because the matched filter and the MMSE receiver
benefit from both power pooling and interference reduction
whereas the decorrelating detector benefits only from power
pooling. Fig. 7 shows the average utility versus system load for
the MMSE receiver for the cases of one, two, four and eight
receive antennas. It is seen that adding more antennas at the
uplink receiver results in considerable gains in the achieved
utility as well as system capacity.
We now look at the utility-maximizing admission control.
We consider the MMSE receiver and plot the total utility as
a function of system load. For each value of α, we distribute
the users in the cell and calculate each user’s utility according
to (23). We then calculate the total utility and repeat this over
10 000 realizations of the users’ locations. Fig. 8 shows the
plot of average total utility versus system load. We have also
plotted Γ as a function of α. As expected, the total utility is
maximized when Γ = 12 . This corresponds to a system load
of 58%.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have examined the cross-layer design
problem of joint multiuser detection and power control in the
uplink of CDMA systems using a game-theoretic approach.
A non-cooperative game is proposed in which users are
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
107
108
109
1010
1011
1012
α
u
a
vg
 
[bi
ts/
Jo
ule
]
m=1
m=2
m=4
m=8
Fig. 7. Average Utility vs Load for the MMSE Receiver with m Receive
Antennas
.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2 x 10
10
α
u
to
t [b
its
/Jo
ule
]
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
α
Γ
Fig. 8. Plots of Total Utility and Γ vs Load for the MMSE Receiver (Single
Receive Antenna).
allowed to choose not only their transmit powers but also
their uplink receivers to maximize their utilities. Focusing
on linear receivers, we have shown that there is a unique
Nash equilibrium for the proposed game. The equilibrium is
achieved when all users pick the MMSE detector as their
uplink receivers and choose their transmit powers such that
their output SIRs are all equal to γ∗. We have further shown
that the Nash equilibrium remains an SIR-balancing solution
when we replace the MMSE receiver with a matched filter or a
decorrelating detector (or any other linear receiver). The target
SIR is affected by the modulation as well as the packet size but
is independent of the receiver. However, the utilities achieved
at equilibria do depend on the receiver. Using a large-system
analysis, we have obtained explicit expressions for the utilities
achieved at equilibrium by the matched filter, the decorrelator
and the MMSE detector, and compared their performance
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in terms of number of bits transmitted per joule of energy
consumed. Significant improvements in achieved utilities and
system capacity have been observed when multiuser detectors
are used in place of the conventional matched filter. We
have also discussed the optimum cooperative solution and
compared its performance with that of the non-cooperative
approach. It has been shown that the difference in performance
is not significant especially for the decorrelator and the MMSE
receiver.
We have also extended our approach to systems with
multiple receive antennas. Conclusions similar to those for
the single antenna case have been made. We have shown that
considerable gains in achieved utilities and system capacity
are obtained when multiple antennas are employed at the
uplink receiver. These gains, which are due to power pooling
and interference reduction, are quantified in terms of number
of bits transmitted per joule of energy. A utility-maximizing
admission control scheme has also been proposed. We have
shown that using the proposed scheme, the total number of
admitted users for the MMSE receiver is greater than or equal
to the total number of admitted users for the matched filter and
decorrelator, depending on the number of receive antennas.
This work has provided a unified game-theoretic formulation
for studying power control and receiver design in DS-CDMA
networks.
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